In modern warfare, the emergence of drone swarm operations poses a significant military threat, driving major powers to explore effective countermeasures. Traditional interception methods, such as kinetic firepower, electronic warfare, and directed energy weapons, each have limitations. Among these, high-power microwave (HPM) weapons stand out due to their rapid engagement speed, wide coverage, prolonged operational duration, and combined soft and hard kill capabilities. This makes HPM systems a promising solution for anti-drone swarm missions. However, assessing whether HPM weapons meet the operational requirements for countering drone swarms necessitates rigorous scientific research. In this study, we focus on capability requirements, analyzing the essential combat capabilities and performance levels needed for HPM anti-drone swarm systems to accomplish designated missions. These capability requirements serve as critical indicators for evaluating system effectiveness. While prior research has qualitatively examined capability requirement generation frameworks, methods, and modeling, quantitative analyses are lacking, leading to vague and unconvincing results. Therefore, we start from the operational tasks and processes of HPM anti-drone swarm systems, decompose these tasks, and establish mathematical mapping models between atomic activities and capability indicators. This quantitative approach derives the required capability metrics, with simulation data illustrating their impact on system performance. Our findings provide a foundational reference for justifying and innovating HPM anti-drone swarm equipment.
The capability requirement generation process for HPM anti-drone swarm systems involves three key steps. First, we decompose the system’s operational tasks into atomic activities based on the combat process. Atomic activities are the smallest, indivisible units that correspond relatively fixedly to the system, achieve specific operational objectives, and are independent. Second, considering the system’s operational functions, employment modes, and technical architectures, we propose overall capability requirements and hierarchically decompose them, ultimately establishing a mapping relationship between operational tasks and capability indicators. Third, based on this mapping, we construct mathematical models for key capability requirement indicators. This structured approach ensures a systematic analysis of anti-drone capabilities.
To elaborate, the operational tasks of HPM anti-drone swarm systems may include deterring aerial threats, protecting critical assets, and supporting other forces. These tasks are decomposed into subtasks: reconnaissance and detection, information processing, command decision-making, interception and strike, and damage assessment. Each subtask further breaks down into atomic activities, such as search and discovery, target identification, tracking, information fusion, plan formulation, jamming, destruction, and target damage evaluation. Correspondingly, the system’s overall capabilities are categorized into reconnaissance and detection, command and control, and interception and strike. These are decomposed into specific indicators, creating a detailed mapping system. For instance, reconnaissance and detection capabilities involve metrics like maximum detection range and tracking accuracy, while interception and strike capabilities include equivalent radiated power and kill area. The mapping relationship is summarized in the table below, highlighting how atomic activities align with capability indicators for anti-drone operations.
| Atomic Activity | Capability Indicator | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Search and Discovery | Maximum Detection Range | Ability to detect drone swarms at the farthest distance. |
| Target Identification | Identification Accuracy | Precision in distinguishing drone swarm targets. |
| Target Tracking | Stable Tracking Range | Distance over which continuous tracking is maintained. |
| Information Fusion | Data Processing Speed | Efficiency in integrating sensor data for situational awareness. |
| Plan Formulation | Decision-Making Time | Time required to develop engagement plans. |
| Jamming | Jamming Power Density | Energy density needed to disrupt drone electronics. |
| Destruction | Equivalent Radiated Power | Radiated power necessary for hard kill effects. |
| Damage Evaluation | Assessment Reliability | Accuracy in judging post-engagement effectiveness. |
Building on this mapping, we develop mathematical models for key capability indicators. The effectiveness of HPM weapons against drone swarms depends on early warning and interception, necessitating models for detection, tracking, and engagement parameters. Assume our protected target is a ground point O, with the HPM system’s radar antenna height denoted as $$h_1$$, the drone swarm flight speed as $$V_a$$, and flight altitude as $$h_2$$. Considering Earth curvature and atmospheric effects, the equivalent Earth radius is $$R_b = 8490 \, \text{km}$$. The maximum line-of-sight detection range of the search radar is given by:
$$R_s = \sqrt{h_1^2 + 2h_1 R_b} + \sqrt{h_2^2 + 2h_2 R_b}$$
In actual operations, system and human response times affect performance. Thus, the farthest detection range of the guidance radar is:
$$R_e = R_s – (t_{jk} + t_{pd} + t_{mn}) V_a$$
where $$t_{jk}$$ is the time for target detection, acquisition, and stable tracking; $$t_{pd}$$ is command decision time; and $$t_{mn}$$ is system reaction time. These factors are critical in anti-drone scenarios, as delayed responses reduce engagement windows.
Similarly, the farthest stable tracking range for the drone swarm target is:
$$R_l = R_e – t_{fy} V_a$$
where $$t_{fy}$$ is the time from detection to combat readiness. This metric directly influences the engagement range for HPM systems.
For interception, the equivalent radiated power (ERP) requirement is derived from the damage threshold of drone receivers. Let $$q_r$$ be the damage power density threshold for an antenna receiver in the drone swarm, and the required damage distance be the stable tracking range $$R_l$$. The power needed to disable the receiver is:
$$P_{xu} = \frac{q_r}{\tau}$$
where $$\tau$$ is the pulse width of the HPM beam. The power coupled into the receiver is:
$$P_{ou} = \frac{A_e \cdot S}{L} = \frac{q_r}{\tau}$$
Here, $$A_e$$ is the effective area of the drone antenna receiver, $$S$$ is the power density at the receiver, and $$L$$ is the internal loss. Assuming the HPM beam main lobe aligns with the drone antenna main lobe, the minimum power density required to disable the receiver is:
$$S_{\text{min}} = \frac{L \cdot q_r}{A_e \tau}$$
Thus, the minimum ERP needed for the HPM anti-drone system is:
$$\text{EIRP}_{\text{min}} = 4\pi R_l^2 \cdot \frac{L \cdot q_r}{A_e \tau}$$
This formula highlights the exponential increase in power demand with range, a key consideration in anti-drone system design.
The kill area analysis further refines engagement effectiveness. As shown in the concept below, an HPM weapon emits a beam with divergence angle $$\phi$$ and ground incidence angle $$\sigma$$, forming an elliptical conical kill zone at range $$R_l$$.

The elliptical area ABCD has major axis $$a$$ and minor axis $$b$$ calculated as:
$$a = R_l \sin \sigma \left[ \tan^{-1}\left( \sigma – \frac{\phi}{2} \right) – \tan^{-1}\left( \sigma + \frac{\phi}{2} \right) \right]$$
$$b = 2R_l \tan\left( \frac{\phi}{2} \right)$$
The kill area $$S_{ABCD}$$ is:
$$S_{ABCD} = \pi R_l^2 \sin \sigma \left[ \tan^{-1}\left( \sigma – \frac{\phi}{2} \right) – \tan^{-1}\left( \sigma + \frac{\phi}{2} \right) \right] \cdot \tan^2\left( \frac{\phi}{2} \right)$$
The power density at point O is $$S = \frac{\text{EIRP}}{4\pi R_l^2}$$. To ensure all drones within the kill zone are neutralized, the power density at the edge (point B) must satisfy $$S_B \geq S_{\text{min}}$$. This condition balances coverage and energy concentration for effective anti-drone engagements.
Damage assessment is evaluated by monitoring drone motion post-engagement. In a ground-based coordinate system centered at the radar, let a drone’s pre-engagement state be $$(x_0, y_0, z_0)$$ and $$(\dot{x}_0, \dot{y}_0, \dot{z}_0)$$. After HPM exposure, subsequent measurements $$(x_i, y_i, z_i)$$ and $$(\dot{x}_i, \dot{y}_i, \dot{z}_i)$$ for $$i = 1 \text{ to } 10$$ are taken. The drone is considered effectively intercepted if:
$$\frac{\sqrt{\dot{x}_i^2 + \dot{z}_i^2}}{\sqrt{\dot{x}_0^2 + \dot{z}_0^2}} < 1 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{y_i}{y_0} < 1$$
This criterion uses velocity and altitude changes to gauge kill probability, essential for assessing anti-drone system performance.
We conduct simulation analyses to validate these models and explore key factors. Assuming radar antenna heights of 0.01 km, 0.1 km, and 1 km, the maximum detection range $$R_s$$ versus drone altitude $$h_2$$ is plotted. For instance, at $$h_2 = 30 \, \text{km}$$, $$R_s$$ values are approximately 730 km, 780 km, and 850 km for the respective antenna heights. This confirms that higher antenna and drone altitudes extend detection ranges, crucial for early warning in anti-drone operations.
Next, we examine how detection range $$R_s$$ influences other capability indicators. Set parameters: $$V_a = 272 \, \text{m/s}$$, $$A_e = 0.02 \, \text{m}^2$$, $$q_r = 10^{-6} \, \text{J}$$, $$L = 0.1$$, $$h_1 = 1 \, \text{km}$$, $$t_{jk} = 10 \, \text{s}$$, $$t_{pd} = 8 \, \text{s}$$, $$t_{mn} = 2 \, \text{s}$$, $$t_{fy} = 4 \, \text{s}$$, and $$\tau = 0.002 \, \text{ns}$$. Varying $$R_s$$ from 10 km to 100 km, we compute $$R_e$$, $$R_l$$, and $$\text{EIRP}_{\text{min}}$$. The results, summarized in the table below, show linear increases in $$R_e$$ and $$R_l$$ with $$R_s$$, but an exponential rise in $$\text{EIRP}_{\text{min}}$$. This underscores the trade-off between range and power requirements in anti-drone systems.
| Detection Range $$R_s$$ (km) | Farthest Detection $$R_e$$ (km) | Stable Tracking $$R_l$$ (km) | Min ERP $$\text{EIRP}_{\text{min}}$$ (W) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 10 | 8.5 | 7.3 | 1.2 × 109 |
| 30 | 26.2 | 24.1 | 3.8 × 1010 |
| 50 | 43.9 | 41.8 | 1.1 × 1011 |
| 70 | 61.6 | 59.5 | 2.1 × 1011 |
| 100 | 88.0 | 85.9 | 4.3 × 1011 |
For kill area analysis, we investigate the effects of angles and range. With fixed $$\phi = 10^\circ$$ and $$R_l = 50 \, \text{km}$$, $$S_{ABCD}$$ varies with $$\sigma$$. It peaks around $$\sigma = 20^\circ – 30^\circ$$, then decreases, reaching a minimum at $$\sigma = 90^\circ$$. This indicates optimal beam incidence for maximizing coverage in anti-drone engagements. Similarly, with fixed $$\sigma = 25^\circ$$ and $$R_l = 50 \, \text{km}$$, $$S_{ABCD}$$ increases with $$\phi$$, as broader beams cover larger areas but may reduce power density. Lastly, with fixed $$\sigma = 25^\circ$$ and $$\phi = 10^\circ$$, $$S_{ABCD}$$ grows with $$R_l$$, emphasizing the need for higher ERP to maintain lethal density at longer ranges. These relationships are quantified in the following tables.
| Ground Angle $$\sigma$$ (°) | Kill Area $$S_{ABCD}$$ (km²) |
|---|---|
| 10 | 12.5 |
| 20 | 24.8 |
| 30 | 22.1 |
| 45 | 15.7 |
| 90 | 0.5 |
| Beam Angle $$\phi$$ (°) | Kill Area $$S_{ABCD}$$ (km²) |
|---|---|
| 5 | 6.3 |
| 10 | 24.8 |
| 15 | 55.2 |
| 20 | 96.5 |
| Tracking Range $$R_l$$ (km) | Kill Area $$S_{ABCD}$$ (km²) |
|---|---|
| 30 | 8.9 |
| 50 | 24.8 |
| 70 | 48.6 |
| 100 | 99.2 |
In practice, larger kill areas are not always better. Given constant ERP, increasing area reduces power density $$S$$, potentially falling below the damage threshold $$S_{\text{min}}$$. Moreover, excessive $$\phi$$ disperses energy, compromising anti-drone effectiveness. Therefore, optimizing $$\sigma$$ and $$\phi$$ is vital for maximizing HPM system performance against drone swarms.
In conclusion, we have systematically analyzed capability requirements for HPM anti-drone swarm systems. By decomposing operational tasks and establishing mathematical mappings, we quantified key indicators such as detection range, tracking range, ERP, and kill area. Simulation results elucidate the relationships between these indicators and influencing factors, like antenna height, drone altitude, beam angles, and response times. Our findings highlight that effective anti-drone operations require balancing detection earlyness, power sufficiency, and coverage optimization. This quantitative approach provides a robust foundation for justifying HPM anti-drone swarm equipment demands and guiding future innovations. As drone threats evolve, continuous refinement of these models will enhance the resilience and efficacy of anti-drone defenses, ensuring mission success in complex combat environments.
