In recent years, the rapid advancement of technology has integrated civil drones into daily life, playing significant roles in aerial photography, remote sensing, mapping, firefighting, and other fields. During the COVID-19 pandemic, logistics companies introduced “drone delivery” services, reducing infection risks, improving efficiency, and expanding the application scope of civil drones. Concurrently, the civil drone industry has shown promising prospects and rapid development, with the market size growing from ¥2.4 billion in 2015 to ¥36.1 billion in 2020, an annual growth rate of 72%. However, alongside these technological benefits, public safety incidents caused by civil drones have become increasingly frequent, escalating public threats and highlighting the imbalance between industry development and control measures. Therefore, in-depth research into civil drone public safety issues is urgently needed.
This study aims to analyze civil drone public safety problems, review current control measures, identify control challenges, and propose optimization paths. From a risk regulation perspective, through literature review, analysis of existing control measures, and real-world examples, the research progresses through three stages: risk identification, risk assessment, and risk regulation, ultimately forming conclusions on civil drone public safety issues.
From literature reviews and case studies, it is evident that current safety risks of civil drones primarily stem from internal risks due to uneven product quality and drone characteristics, and external risks from four types of actors related to civil drones. Key public safety issues include collisions, crashes, “black flights” disrupting aviation, terrorist attacks, criminal activities, and privacy breaches. Despite a series of control measures implemented in China, factors such as incomplete regulations, unclear regulatory bodies, and inadequate personnel management have led to unsatisfactory results, with multiple public safety incidents still occurring, severely endangering public safety.
From a risk regulation perspective, this paper focuses on the inadequacies in civil drone control and proposes optimization paths through comprehensive analysis. First, further improve the civil drone institutional system by promptly issuing industry standards, refining drone categories for classified management, and introducing airspace management models. Second, strengthen control over four types of personnel—production, sales, ownership, and operation—to reduce risks from human factors. Third, enhance multi-departmental cooperative governance to achieve co-governance, co-construction, and mutual benefits. Finally, establish emergency response mechanisms, build integrated platforms, improve comprehensive defense capabilities, and fully utilize new equipment to diversify control measures.
Introduction
The concept of “risk society,” first proposed by German sociologist Ulrich Beck in his 1986 book “Risk Society,” has gained widespread attention and research. Current risk society studies span sociology, public administration, law, political science, economics, and psychology, exhibiting interdisciplinary trends. From a regulatory perspective, based on systems theory, it emphasizes systematic descriptions of risks and focuses on the complexity of organizational structures, rules, practices, and concepts related to regulating specific risks and hazards, linking “risk” and “regulation.” Risk regulation involves managing future potential damages by implementing control and elimination measures to reduce the likelihood of risks evolving into actual harm, with the core principle of achieving maximum benefits at minimal cost, representing a fundamental, preventive, and comprehensive task.
As physical entities in society, civil drones become risk factors due to various elements, posing challenges to national and public safety. In control processes, the focus is on balancing the public safety risks posed by civil drones with regulatory measures, clearly connecting “risk” and “regulation.” Moreover, controlling civil drones through a single department is impractical due to the broad scope and multiple involved agencies, requiring joint efforts to leverage respective functions for effective control. Thus, this paper applies risk regulation theory and cooperative governance theory, using risk regulation as the research perspective to analyze public safety risks from civil drones and propose control optimization paths through cooperative governance.
Civil drones, as an emerging industry, have gradually entered people’s daily lives and play important roles in remote sensing, mapping, disaster prevention, and mitigation. However, the negative impacts of civil drones are increasing, particularly concerning public safety. Based on a risk regulation perspective, this study addresses civil drone public safety issues by improving regulatory systems, reducing safety risks, and clarifying regulatory responsibilities.
Conceptual Definition and Theoretical Basis
Safety, as defined in the “Modern Chinese Dictionary,” means “no danger, no threat, no accidents.” Literally, “safety” implies personal peace and physical integrity without harm. In ancient societies, safety primarily referred to human life threats from natural disasters, wildlife, and wars. With the advent of the agricultural era, material abundance expanded the scope of safety. In modern times, the rise and rapid development of industrial civilization incorporated technological risks, environmental damage, and economic crises into the safety domain. Thus, safety permeates all areas of human society, becoming a basic need. In daily production activities, safety refers to a state where personnel in production systems are free from unacceptable risks, no accidents occur, and no casualties or property losses happen. Therefore, safety includes both personal and property safety.
When discussing safety definitions, besides linking to production activities, psychological aspects must be considered, as humans, being thoughtful, can perceive unsafe situations. If constantly threatened by external factors, whether natural disasters or societal behaviors, one cannot feel secure. American psychologist Abraham Maslow proposed the hierarchy of needs in “A Theory of Human Motivation,” categorizing human needs from low to high: physiological, safety, social, esteem, and self-actualization. This indicates that after meeting basic physiological needs, safety—encompassing security, order, stability, and freedom from fear, threats, and pain—is paramount.
This study focuses on public safety, which can be broadly or narrowly defined. Narrowly, it refers to work in public security and social stability, such as safety prevention, protection, and maintenance. Broadly, it involves the life and property safety of most people, including but not limited to information security, food safety, and traffic safety.
Unmanned Aircraft (UA), also known as Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA), are aircraft managed by remote stations (including remote control or autonomous flight). As a type of aircraft, their primary characteristic is the absence of onboard personnel. Through prolonged development, drone usage has shifted from initial military applications to civil uses, widely employed in agriculture, industry, rescue, mapping, and other fields. This study focuses on civil drones.
The Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) defined drones in the “Light and Small Drone Operation Regulations” issued in December 2015 as “aircraft primarily using radio technology for remote operation or capable of autonomous flight via built-in programs.” Additionally, the “Interim Regulations on the Management of Civil Unmanned Aircraft System Pilots” issued in May 2017 defines civil drones as “aircraft without onboard pilots, equipped with flight control systems, and engaged in non-military, non-police, and non-customs flight tasks, excluding model aircraft, unmanned free balloons, and tethered balloons.”
To facilitate management, CAAC classifies civil drones based on empty weight and maximum takeoff weight into categories such as ultra-micro, micro, small, light, medium, large, and heavy, as shown in Table 1.
| Category | Empty Weight (kg) | Max Takeoff Weight (kg) | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| I | 0 < W ≤ 1.5 | – | Ultra-micro |
| II | 1.5 < W ≤ 4 | 1.5 < W ≤ 7 | Micro |
| III | 4 < W ≤ 15 | 7 < W ≤ 25 | Small |
| IV | 15 < W ≤ 116 | 25 < W ≤ 150 | Light |
| V | – | – | Plant protection drones |
| VI | – | – | Unmanned airships |
| VII | – | – | Category I/II drones operating beyond visual line of sight over 100m |
| XI | 116 < W ≤ 5700 | 150 < W ≤ 5700 | Medium, Large |
| XII | W > 5700 | – | Heavy |
With advancements in intelligence, information, and communication technologies, the barrier to entry for civil drones has lowered, allowing ordinary citizens to own them. However, this has led to various safety issues: “black flights” disrupting aviation, accidental injuries, illegal transport, privacy breaches, etc. Consequently, the State Council and the Central Military Commission Air Traffic Control Committee Office drafted the “Interim Regulations on the Management of Unmanned Aircraft Flight” and solicited public opinions on January 26, 2018, establishing national strategic deployments for civil drone control.
Civil drone control encompasses seven aspects: market management, flight management, operator management, control systems, airspace management, wireless signal management, and auxiliary control measures. Comprehensive control ensures safe flight, prevents public safety issues, and promotes sustainable development of the civil drone industry.
Risk regulation theory manages potential future damages by implementing control and elimination measures to reduce the likelihood of risks materializing, emphasizing cost-effectiveness as a fundamental, preventive, and comprehensive task. From a risk regulation perspective, researching civil drone public safety issues involves analyzing risks to China’s low-altitude airspace, addressing current challenges, and proposing optimization paths. The analysis includes risk identification, risk assessment, and risk regulation.
Risk identification is the first step in risk regulation, serving as its premise and foundation. It involves perceiving potential risk accidents, analyzing underlying causes, identifying hazard sources, and establishing risk databases. Only comprehensive and accurate risk identification enables scientific measurement, evaluation, and response method selection. Essentially, risk identification collects information on risk factors, accidents, and loss exposures, identifying factors leading to potential losses and judging, summarizing, and verifying them.
Risk assessment is the core of risk regulation, involving comprehensive consideration of loss frequency, severity, and other factors to analyze risk impacts and evaluate risk status after identification and measurement. Key elements include comprehensive risk evaluation and determining risk ownership.
Risk regulation refers to control and elimination measures taken by regulatory bodies to address risks, primarily involving post-risk handling, including determining possible measures, evaluating related measures, selecting priority measures, implementing chosen measures, and supervising implementation. The essence of risk regulation is public policy decision-making, execution, and supervision. After emergencies, management departments must make decisions under uncertainty, execute them, and supervise implementation post-event to ensure scientific and democratic operation of risk regulation as public policy. In this study, based on risk regulation theory, civil drone public safety issues are analyzed through risk identification, assessment, and regulation, ultimately proposing optimization paths.
Cooperative governance theory, initially proposed by Western scholars, addresses complex public issues by achieving common mutual goals through collective decision-making and institutional arrangements involving federal governments, social organizations, civil groups, and enterprises. Unlike traditional government-centric models, it emphasizes mobilizing social forces on equal terms for co-governance, co-construction, and mutual benefit.
Cooperative governance offers several advantages: effective integration of resources, leveraging multi-stakeholder strengths through consultation, communication, and sharing to form synergies; accelerated social governance efficiency, driven by mutual goals, actively engaging various parties; and improved governance quality, through continuous consultation and communication, understanding interests and difficulties, meeting complex social demands, and constraining and guiding shortcomings to enhance governance levels and achieve expected outcomes.
Cooperative governance theory has three characteristics:多元性 (diversity) of participants, as relying solely on government is insufficient for post-industrial societal issues, requiring multi-stakeholder involvement;协商性 (consultative) governance process, emphasizing political consultation among government and non-government organizations, involving compromise in public affairs management, making it a democratic process; and相互依赖性 (interdependence) among governance subjects, utilizing respective resources—government with power, non-government with funds and information, civil organizations with public opinion—complementing each other in cooperative governance for “1+1>2” effects.
Due to the involvement of multiple departments in civil drone safety control, which cannot be handled by a single functional department, this study adheres to cooperative governance theory in proposing optimization paths, leveraging multi-department control bodies in different fields for joint participation, amplifying resource advantages in the control process to address current civil drone safety issues.
Public Safety Issues and Risk Identification
Civil drone control differs from other public domains, possessing certain particularities. Therefore, before analyzing civil drone public safety issues, it is essential to review various public safety incidents caused by civil drones, categorize public safety problems, and identify commonalities. Additionally, as risk identification is the first step in risk regulation, only by correctly identifying risk sources can appropriate handling methods be selected.
With the popularization of civil drones in recent years, their usage has multiplied, and due to inadequate control, safety issues have frequently occurred. A prominent problem is civil drones interfering with normal civil aviation operations, drawing high attention from CAAC, air traffic control, public security, and other departments. Furthermore, civil drones can cause public safety issues such as disturbing social order, threatening national security, and facilitating criminal activities. This section compiles domestic and international public safety incidents from literature, summarizing civil drone public safety issues into five categories: collisions and crashes, “black flights” disrupting aviation, terrorist attacks, criminal activities, and privacy breaches.
Collisions and crashes are the most common public safety issues involving civil drones, often resulting from operator errors, unfamiliarity with terrain, or sudden airflow effects. Experimental data show that if a 10kg civil drone collides with an aircraft traveling at 900 km/h, the impact force can instantly reach 1.25 million Newtons, equivalent to a small-caliber artillery shell, with astonishing power. If colliding with buildings or crashing, electronic devices may explode under pressure, with equally significant destructive potential.
For instance, on January 26, 2015, a small civil drone crashed into the White House, causing a minor explosion and triggering a “first-level alert.” Investigation revealed the drone was conducting aerial photography nearby, crashing due to operational error. After repeated checks confirmed no threat, the alert was lifted. On February 18, 2017, in Kanagawa Prefecture, Japan, a civil drone crashed into a construction crane during aerial photography, injuring a person’s face, marking Japan’s first drone injury incident. On March 29, 2018, in New Zealand, a light aircraft was struck by a civil drone, causing a rapid descent within 30 seconds, damaging cabin doors, and crashing into a cornfield, injuring the pilot—New Zealand’s first drone-aircraft collision.
Similar incidents have occurred in China: on May 9, 2020, a civil drone crashed into a power line due to operational error, causing hours of power disruption; on June 14, 2021, during a drone show in Shanghai, about 30 drones fell, hitting luxury yachts and cruise ships, injuring multiple people and damaging property.
“Black flights” disrupting aviation refer to civil drones illegally entering airport clearance zones, interfering with civil aircraft, causing numerous flight delays, diversions, ground holds, and even airport closures, resulting in economic losses and severe travel safety impacts. For example, in December 2014, London Heathrow and Gatwick airports reported drone intrusions nearly colliding with landing aircraft. According to the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, in the latter half of 2014, 175 reports of drones approaching airspace were filed, including several near-misses, posing higher public safety threats than terrorist attacks. In China, such incidents have exploded: data from Bard College showed 327 dangerous approach incidents between December 17, 2013, and September 12, 2015, with 28 causing flight diversions to avoid collisions, mostly due to human factors and operational errors.
On December 29, 2013, a Beijing aviation technology company employee, without drone pilot qualifications or pre-flight approval, illegally operated a drone for aerial surveying, intruding into airport clearance, disrupting civil aviation, forcing two flights to evade, one flying an extra 12.5 km, and delaying 10 flights at Beijing Capital Airport, stranding over 2,000 passengers. The incident involved 1,226 military personnel, two fighter jets on standby, two helicopters, 26 radars, and 123 vehicles. The perpetrator was sentenced, marking China’s first criminal case for drone “black flight” disruption. From April 14 to 21, 2017, Chengdu Shuangliu International Airport experienced nine drone disruptions in 17 days, severely affecting operations, with over 100 flights diverted, returned, or delayed, causing unprecedented harm. Similar incidents occurred in Zhejiang, Hainan, Guangdong, Shenzhen, and Kunming, with drones entering clearance zones, some within 50-70 meters of aircraft.
Terrorist attacks using drones have emerged due to their small size, difficulty in detection, speed, and mobility. In 2014, drones were used to probe national infrastructure: French authorities reported drones flying over nuclear facilities; Belgium faced similar threats. On February 11, 2014, Iraqi insurgents used a drone with a homemade bomb to destroy a military vehicle. In 2016, Kurdish fighters shot down a small drone rigged with explosives disguised as a battery, killing two and injuring two. In 2018, drone attacks intensified: Russia’s Syrian base was attacked by 13 drones, with three more attacks in April, May, and June, totaling four coordinated assaults in six months. On August 4, 2018, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro survived a drone bomb attack during a military parade, setting a precedent for drone assassination attempts.
Analysis reveals that involved drones are cheap, easy to operate, and accessible, lacking registration, allowing terrorists to exploit them as weapons. Criminal activities leverage drones’ payload capacity and terrain evasion for smuggling and drug trafficking. In 2013, four men in Georgia, USA, used drones to drop items into a prison yard; on January 22, 2015, drones were found transporting drugs across the U.S.-Mexico border; similar cases occurred in Thailand and the UK, using micro-drones for cannabis, phones, and weapons. In the UK, criminals used drones to scout targets for robberies.
Privacy breaches occur when drones equipped with cameras are misused for unauthorized surveillance. In May 2015, an unidentified man used a drone to photograph SNH48 members changing clothes in Saipan, leaking private images. On February 15, 2017, a drone appeared outside a women’s dormitory at Anhui Agricultural University, approaching balconies before being driven away. In July 2017, a man in Xi’an used a drone with a camera to livestream inappropriate footage to over 100 viewers, severely threatening public privacy.
Risk identification involves internal and external sources. Internal risks stem from the drones themselves: small size, high speed, low altitude, and difficulty in detection. Main detection methods include radar, radio spectrum, photoelectric, and acoustic detection. Most civil drones are small, weighing a few kilograms; in October 2019, DJI launched “Mavic Mini,” weighing only 249g, foldable to palm size. Made of non-metallic materials, they have weak radar reflection, move rapidly up to 13 m/s, and are hard to detect visually or with conventional methods. Equipped with cameras, they are easy to operate via mobile devices with basic commands. Using Bluetooth for data transmission limits flight altitude to around 10 meters, below the 100-meter detection range of most systems, making low-altitude flights undetectable.
Uneven product quality is another internal risk. Besides renowned manufacturers like DJI and EHang, many “assembly plants” exist. Without unified production standards, quality varies; some manufacturers cut costs or use substandard parts, leading to inconsistent performance and safety hazards.
External risks involve four actor types: production personnel, sales personnel, owners, and operators, each posing different safety risks throughout the drone lifecycle. Production personnel, driven by economic benefits, may compromise quality due to low entry barriers and lack of standards, using inferior materials or overproducing, introducing risks at the source. Sales personnel often fail to follow procedures, such as not recording buyer information or selling prohibited, unverified, or counterfeit products, especially on e-commerce platforms, increasing control difficulties. Owners may violate registration requirements, not updating information after transfer or sale, complicating incident response. Operators often lack proper training, with many flying without licenses (“black flights”), and inadequate training programs exacerbate risks.
The risk from production personnel arises as the drone manufacturer prioritizes profit over quality, leading to substandard products. Sales personnel neglect duties, failing to verify buyers or adhere to regulations. Owners disregard registration rules, and operators engage in unlicensed flights due to high certification costs and low awareness.
Current Control Measures and Risk Assessment
Compared to other aircraft, civil drone flight is simpler, with low entry barriers, short startup times, rapid ascent, and high flexibility. These advantages also easily induce safety risks, demanding new requirements from regulators. Countries worldwide are formulating control measures and establishing management systems for civil drones.
In 1990, the U.S. allowed civil drones into the National Airspace System (NAS), an early control measure. Over the years, with explosive industry growth, drone control has evolved through stages, primarily focusing on legislative, policy, multi-department joint, and auxiliary control.
Legislative control in China includes the “Civil Aviation Law” enacted in 1995, aimed at safeguarding airspace sovereignty, ensuring safe and orderly civil aviation, protecting parties’ rights, and promoting development. Revised six times since, it comprises 16 chapters and 215 articles, covering aircraft airworthiness, personnel management, search and rescue, and foreign aircraft regulations. Article 145 defines general aviation scope, including civil drones, but only partially applies principles like airworthiness and personnel management. As drones were not widely used initially, specific regulations were lacking. On December 29, 2018, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress amended the law, adding Article 214 authorizing the State Council and Central Military Commission to regulate unmanned aircraft, providing a legal basis.
The “Public Security Administration Punishment Law” (2005) applies to administrative penalties for drone-related public safety issues, such as disturbing public order under Article 23 or unlicensed operation under Article 64. For severe threats or national security violations, the “Criminal Law” has relevant provisions.
Policy control has seen CAAC issue several regulations. In November 2013, the “Interim Regulations on the Management of Civil Unmanned Aircraft System Pilots” was released, the first comprehensive management rule, designating the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association of China (AOPA) for management, classifying drones by weight, and specifying pilot requirements. In March 2015, the “Light and Small Drone Operation Trial Regulations” required drones over 7kg to have electronic fences and cloud systems, with reporting frequencies. In September 2016, the “Civil Unmanned Aircraft System Air Traffic Management Measures” regulated usage and strengthened flight activity management. In May 2017, the drone registration system launched; on June 1, the “Civil Unmanned Aircraft Real-Name Registration Regulations” mandated registration for drones over 250g. In January 2018, the “Interim Regulations on Unmanned Aircraft Flight Management” was drafted for feedback, issued in July 2020, further constraining systems, pilots, airspace, operations, and liabilities.
Local governments have issued over 43 regulations. Sichuan Province has systematic rules: on September 1, 2016, the Public Security Department, with military and aviation authorities, issued a notice strengthening airport clearance protection, prohibiting unauthorized flights, and establishing registration, management, flight planning, information transfer, emergency response, and law enforcement procedures. On June 12, 2017, the Southwest Regional Administration emphasized safety checks and drone control. On August 7, 2017, the Sichuan Provincial Government passed the “Sichuan Civil Unmanned Aircraft Safety Management Interim Provisions,” effective September 20, with six chapters and 38 articles detailing departmental duties, daily management, flight management, emergency response, and liabilities.
Zhejiang Province enacted the first local regulation focused on prevention. In late 2017, the “Zhejiang Small Unmanned Aircraft Safety Management Regulations (Draft)” sought public opinion. On March 28, 2019, the Provincial People’s Congress passed the “Zhejiang Unmanned Aircraft Public Safety Management Regulations,” effective May 1, with 20 articles covering regulatory objects, principles, systems, real-name registration, no-fly zones, flight behavior, and liabilities, emphasizing public safety and prevention.
Shenzhen introduced operable local rules. On September 8, 2017, the Transport Commission released “Drone Management Measures for Public Opinion,” limiting management to light small drones (0.25kg to 7kg). After hearings and research, on January 2, 2019, the municipal government passed the “Shenzhen Civil Micro and Light Drone Management Interim Measures,” effective March 1, with five chapters and 44 articles on flight rules, production and sales management, accident prevention, and penalties. It specifies regulatory objects, divides functions, defines no-fly zones, requires compliance with standards, and mandates propeller guards for flights within 3 meters, enabling practical control.
Multi-department joint control involves several agencies: CAAC for operation, air flight, pilot and training institution qualifications; the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology for equipment industry and frequency management; the Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs for export control; and the China Drone Industry Alliance for technical standards. Table 2 summarizes responsibilities.
| Department | Specific Control Responsibilities |
|---|---|
| Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) | Manages drone operation, air flight, pilot and training institution qualifications. The “Interim Regulations on Civil Unmanned Aircraft System Pilots” (2009) and “Civil Unmanned Aircraft Pilot Management Regulations” (2018) specify pilot management, license requirements, and e-license management. The “Light and Small Civil Drone Flight Dynamic Data Management Regulations” (2019) require real-time data reporting via UTMISS. |
| Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) | Manages machinery, aviation, automotive, shipbuilding, and major technical equipment. The Equipment Industry Department oversees drone R&D and production; frequency management allocates 840.5-845MHz, 1430-1444MHz, and 2408-2440MHz for drones. |
| Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs | Manages drone exports. The “Announcement on Strengthening Export Control of Some Dual-Use Items” (2015) controls certain unmanned aircraft exports from August 15, 2015. |
| China Drone Industry Alliance | Drafts and formulates general technical standards for civil drones. |
Auxiliary control employs technical measures. The “Light and Small Drone Operation Regulations” (December 29, 2015) require drones over 7kg to have “electronic fences” and “drone clouds,” with reporting frequencies: at least once per second in densely populated areas, every 30 seconds elsewhere; for key areas and airport clearance, drones over 1.5kg and plant protection drones must also have them, reporting at least once per minute. Electronic fences use pulsed electronics and geofencing to define boundaries, integrating with flight control to restrict airspace, while drone clouds record flight data for over three months, akin to “black boxes,” aiding incident response.
Hardware auxiliary control includes interference disruption systems, such as electromagnetic or acoustic jammers, to disrupt drone communication and navigation, causing hover, return, or landing. Electromagnetic and acoustic guns are common. On November 19, 2018, Shenzhen launched a drone flight management pilot and comprehensive supervision platform, publishing implementation plans and measures, marking trial operation of integrated air-ground, multi-department cooperative management. The platform innovatively connects military, civil aviation, and local government systems, enabling user linkage, information sharing, clear responsibilities, and joint supervision.
Current control challenges include inadequate regulations and standards. Vacancies exist in market access, airworthiness certification, flight qualifications, flight control, and personnel training, lacking rules for drone safety, technical parameters, and production standards. Management-wise, drones fall under the State Sports General Administration’s model aircraft category, but most public safety issues are non-sport-related, requiring other departments, highlighting regulatory inapplicability.
Public safety risks have significantly increased. Drone industrialization is key in China’s 13th and 14th Five-Year Plans. Driven by technology and market forces, light small drone numbers have exploded. Statistics show 1,228 registered manufacturers, mostly in Guangdong, Beijing, Shandong, Jiangsu, Henan, and Sichuan; China produces 70% of the world’s light small drones, with a complete R&D, production, sales, and service system. Drones are evolving smaller, smarter, and multi-functional, with demand surging and numbers “soaring.”
In 2015, the State Council’s “Made in China 2025” and “Internet+” strategies boosted the industry. Data indicate continuous growth from 2015 to 2020, with an average annual increase over 55%. By November 2019, 376,000 drones were registered, an increase of 100,000, with 1.21 million flight hours. According to Guanyan Tianxia’s 2019 report, the market size exceeded ¥20 billion; 2020 sales reached 290,000 units, industry output over ¥100 billion, showing惊人 growth. Consequently, control difficulty multiplies, and public safety issues emerge: inability to monitor thousands of flights with current equipment and personnel, potentially “missing some”; impact on civil aviation transport, e.g., 12 incidents in 17 days in April 2017, affecting over 100 flights and 50,000 passengers, causing over ¥10 million losses; threats to public safety due to regulatory gaps in subject division, responsibility, and applicable laws.
Low-altitude airspace control pressure has surged. Drones’ ease of “anytime, quick” flight brings convenience but challenges low-altitude management. Currently, low-altitude airspace is not fully integrated into air traffic control, lacking legal assurance, and not open to drones, which are not included in domestic flight plans. Without authoritative regulations, drone use relies on conventions and coordination, with unresolved safety issues regarding drones themselves, interactions with other aircraft, cargo transport liability, and ground damage.
Risk assessment reveals several control deficiencies. Lack of production standards leads to uneven quality. In 1980, Shaanxi Science and Technology Commission commissioned Northwestern Polytechnical University to develop the D-4 multi-purpose drone, certified in December 1983, and produced in small batches in 1995, China’s first true civil drone. With market growth, manufacturers like DJI, Zero Tech, QIWA, and Yunding emerged. Approximately 200 manufacturers sold over 180,000 drones in 2018, sales over ¥11 billion, growth over 20%; expected output by 2025 is ¥180 billion. However, 90% lack proprietary technology, some assemble parts or counterfeit, producing “three-no” drones (no manufacturer, address, or license), with unguaranteed quality, posing safety hazards. Without national R&D, manufacturing, or design standards, producers use own criteria, and many transition from model aircraft or manned aircraft, lacking experience, resulting in unreliable performance and airworthiness.
Sales personnel violations and online platform difficulties exist. The 2017 real-name registration requires drones over 250g to register. To evade, sellers manipulate weight, with e-commerce platforms listing thousands under 250g, often 249g. For heavier drones, many sellers, including manufacturers, neglect verification; buyers simply provide details and pay, especially on second-hand platforms with zero thresholds, no real-name checks, increasing risks.
Owners fail to严格执行 real-name registration. The 2017 regulations require owners to register in the “Drone Real-Name Registration System,” update information after transfer, damage, scrap, loss, or theft, and new owners must re-register. In practice, most owners comply, but system “loopholes” allow false information without verification. Updates after transfer are slow or absent, risking incident response difficulties in identifying responsible parties.
Operator资质不齐, “black flights” are severe. Unlike manned aircraft, drones separate operator and craft, complicating control and requiring higher skills. The 2013 regulations mandate AOPA certification for drones over 7kg flying beyond 500m radius or 120m height, involving theory (laws, principles, performance) and practice (skills, health) exams. Pilot certificates started in June 2014; CAAC reports licenses grew from 1,898 in 2015 to 22,645 in 2019, annual increase 64.19%; exam applicants rose 141.44% yearly. But compared to explosive growth, licenses are insufficient.
Most training relies on manufacturers, lacking standardized programs and systems, with few qualified pilots. Pre-regulation, all were unlicensed. Limited training institutions, weak faculty, and difficult self-study result in ~80% theory pass rates and <70% practice, making certification hard, leading many to risk unlicensed “black flights.”
In summary, with increasing drones and applications, China has初步 formed control in three aspects: regulations from CAAC to locals约束 definitions, classifications, and usage; multi-department joint governance across the industry; and “software + hardware” auxiliary measures for new risks. But problems remain: broad scope leads to weak key link control. Drones have dual attributes as commodities and special aircraft, requiring lifecycle control—production, sales, use, maintenance, scrap—involving CAAC, MIIT, SAMR, Customs, police, sports, military, etc. Critical production and sales links are weak; without unified standards and sales permits, plus e-commerce, markets are chaotic,埋下 hazards.
National standards are absent; only two surveying standards exist (CH/Z 3001-2010, CH/Z 3002-2010), so control lacks a standard system, hindering support and causing无序 development. Real-name registration is inadequately implemented. Vague owner requirements allow manufacturers and owners to “exploit loopholes,” not strictly registering; the system doesn’t link with public security databases, preventing cross-verification and valid information. Operator control is lacking. Regulations require training and “licensed operation,” but few training points, low awareness, and other factors cause severe “black flights,” poor personnel management.
Overall, drone control has many issues. Researching and optimizing the system is crucial for improving control, solving public safety problems, and promoting industry and economic development.
Risk Cause Analysis
Civil drones are widely used in military, agriculture, inspection, aerial photography, remote sensing, logistics, etc., bringing convenience but greatly increasing control difficulty. Additionally, CAAC lacks complete laws specifically for civil drones, systems, and control measures, so the regulatory system is imperfect.
Horizontal comparison shows CAAC’s control for civil aviation transport is relatively complete, with laws and operating rules for pilots, aircraft, flight conditions, loading, routes, meteorology, etc., supplemented by airlines and local governments. Online searches reveal over 30 laws for pilots alone.
Unclear legal attributes of drone regulation stem from the “Flight Basic Rules of the People’s Republic of China” (2000), Article 35: “Aircraft approved to leave or enter Chinese airspace, and flights between control zones, must be approved by the PLA Air Force; flights within zones by responsible departments.” The “Public Security Administration Punishment Law” Article 64 penalizes unlicensed operation with fines or detention. blurred界定 of drones as aircraft causes legal application deviations in risk incidents, reducing policy support.
Lack of industry standards and technical specifications persists. The civil drone industry grows over 55% annually, boosted by “Made in China 2025” and “Internet+.” Over 400 manufacturers produce 600 types; by end-2020, annual shipments reached 650,000 units. But the industry is分散, no authoritative R&D, design, or manufacturing standards, many drone manufacturer use own criteria, no unified GB national standards, causing uneven product quality, performance, navigation levels, management difficulties, and hazards.
Manufacturing lacks unified technical quality standards. Besides R&D units, military groups, research institutes, and private enterprises have entered. Without national standards, producers use own, quality varies, and most transition from model or manned aircraft, lacking experience, leading to unreliable performance and airworthiness, redundant R&D, low-level competition, wasted funds, and unsafe incidents.
Inadequate emergency plans are evident. Drone disruptions often cluster, e.g., nine incidents in 17 days at Chengdu Shuangliu Airport in April 2017, causing 114 diversions, over 40 delays, four returns, and 10,000 stranded passengers. Control processes show delayed detection and制止 of illegal flights, with emergency evasions only when safety threatened; authorities lack应急预案 mechanisms, managers lack experience, and governments don’t adjust plans post-incident to identify gaps, leading to repeated issues.
Light penalties exist. The 1995 “Civil Aviation Law” sets prohibitions but no specific penalties for illegal interference. The “Criminal Law” has provisions for hijacking, major accidents, false information, but not drone-related crimes. For criminal acts,危害公共安全罪 applies; for non-criminal, “Public Security Administration Punishment Law” Article 23 imposes warnings, fines, or detention. Thus, penalties are light, consequences lower than harms, with low违法成本. For operators, no specific penalties; most liability relies on civil tort law via litigation. Currently, operators face administrative penalties under the “Public Security Administration Punishment Law,” with light deterrence; 2017 revisions strengthened penalties, but 15-day detention maximum is too light for public safety threats.
Drone-related personnel lack risk awareness. From sales, a survey of 14实体店 and online brand sellers assessed履行提醒责任 in product safety information, flight operation safety, real-name registration, and no-fly zone warnings. Though small, samples included leaders, sales champions, known, price-advantaged, and niche representatives, so issues are representative, informing optimization.
All 14 sellers introduced product information; 11 covered flight safety (including tutorials); 11 explained registration, seven with videos; seven warned of no-fly zones. Results show: online sellers perform worse; niche brands worse than majors; mandatory registration not fully implemented. Thus, in primary control, sellers inadequately enforce regulations.
The drone real-name registration system has vulnerabilities. For drones over 250g, owners must register, but personal data entry lacks verification—false names, IDs, or serial numbers pass, generating valid QR codes. This hampers control, making the system ineffective.
Operator violations are common. Drone license exams and issuance are by AOPA. Training takes 20 days, with theory, practice, and oral tests, costs ¥12,000-30,000. Compared to cheap drones, license time and effort are high, and most use is recreational, with simple “start-ascend-adjust-descend-land” operations via camera. Many operators deem themselves proficient, skip licenses, leading to “black,” “random,” unlicensed flights, complicating control.
License management chaos and low violation costs include overlapping functions. AOPA (under CAAC) and ASFC (under State Sports General Administration) both train and issue licenses. AOPA has 339 approved training institutions (265 operational), 31 exam centers, 44,573 certificates, average 148.05 applicants, 54.87% pass rate. ASFC, a sports organization, has 31 assessment units, ~1,500 licensees. Overlap causes多头 management, e.g., CAAC not recognizing sports licenses, local air control denying athlete certificates as valid.
Weak license certification: post-license, CAAC lacks ongoing qualification rules. Reference civil aviation pilots require annual retraining, medical checks, certification flights, and CAAC verification. Regulations require operator license renewal every two years, but for drones, this interval is long. Civil pilots renew annually; over 45, twice yearly. For operators, long intervals may cause skill rust, increasing “human factor” errors; no rules for non-renewal, failure, or legal violations—offenders can reapply, clearing records.
Dispersed control lacks synergy. The State Council and National Air Traffic Control Committee are top managers, but work is “siloed,” departments act independently, no “合力.” As applications diversify, control needs differ: plant protection drones have height, speed, weight rules, others not; multiple,冗杂 departments cause unclear subjects, regulatory chaos, hindering development.
Current regulation follows “no violation, no accident” principles, making many rules fragmented. Local policies often address only flight control, single links, not full lifecycle—R&D, production, sales, use, scrap—lacking theoretical support, not “global” or systematic; airworthiness standards are irregular, laws lack guidance, causing incomplete, imperfect regulation.
Control vacuums and lack of foresight exist. From a lifecycle view, control links are vague, each “rough,” causing many vacuums. First, incomplete laws: R&D lacks enterprise technology, fund, resource reviews, allowing “gray” market entry; sales, with e-commerce, enable easy purchases, no online restrictions; use, no airworthiness rules; second, chaotic training and certification: no unified standards, varying courses, not all covering skills, knowledge, laws; third, poor multi-department coordination, delayed information.
Market-wise, control lacks foresight, unprepared for “explosive” growth: technology advances, control capability stagnant; low-altitude policy unbroken, unable to handle mass airspace use; control measures “patchy,” solving problems post-occurrence, no pre-judgment or responses.
Optimization Paths
With rapid promotion across industries, especially during the 2020 pandemic, civil drone logistics showed advantages in “zero contact, speed, efficiency, low errors,” greatly developing applications. Meanwhile, studies show many control deficiencies. As an emerging industry, the control system’s quality directly affects its lifespan. Thus, through previous analysis, optimization paths for civil drone public safety issues are proposed.
By end-2020, CAAC issued guidelines like “Light and Small Civil Drone Flight Dynamic Data Management Regulations,” “Civil Unmanned Aircraft Pilot Management Regulations,” “Opinions on Airworthiness Review Based on Operational Risk,” “Light and Small Drone Operation Regulations,” and “Drone Manufacturing Enterprise Specification Conditions,” and management rules like “Interim Measures for Civil Unmanned Aircraft Operational Flight Activities,” “Civil Unmanned Aircraft Real-Name Registration Regulations,” “Civil Unmanned Aircraft System Air Traffic Management Measures,” and “Interim Regulations on Civil Unmanned Aircraft System Pilots.” As China’s civil drone industry started late, the system is incomplete. Following “control forward” principles, improve the institutional system in three aspects.
Strengthen source management and完善制定保障. Without unified production standards, drone quality varies, markets chaotic, so intervene in production and testing, set industry standards. For institutional保障, promptly issue comprehensive control documents covering entire lifecycle: R&D, production, sales, use, personnel license management, certification, training, emergency management. Local governments, specialized departments, associations should improve existing systems, raise industry thresholds, add standards, establish保障.
In production: first, mandate certain drones install electronic fences, GPS, etc.; second, use uniform color codes by application; third, key hardware/software systems and assembly drone manufacturer must obtain production licenses, ensuring part and whole compliance; fourth, each body must have a unique ID in conspicuous位置. Additionally, require manuals, safety guides, no-fly maps, maintenance instructions.
Pre-sale, authorized testing agencies should check each batch’s flight parameters, key systems, and whole reliability, avoiding defects causing incidents, improving quality.
Beyond the real-name system, establish a drone registration system,完善注册登记制度. Include all market-sold drones (online) in control, real-name registration, “one person, one drone.” If owners change, update promptly; if scrapped, deregister. Use tech—data, cloud, AI—for smart, scientific, data-driven, cost-optimal control.
Refine drone categories for classified management. Current分级 by weight, radius, height, but by flight principles, drones include rotors, gliders, airships, many multi-rotor. In分级管理,细化分类, set rules by type, leveraging advantages. As industry matures, tech advances, trends toward smaller, smarter, easier operation, fast iteration, old categories inapplicable, need updates for new products, ensuring control.
A new classification management mechanism sorts existing methods, categorizing drones from five dimensions into four control levels, marked red, yellow, blue, white from high to low. Unlike single-trait classification, it considers empty weight, activity radius, flight height, speed, and camera function, compromising data for threat levels, each level对应 parameters, refining categories for better control. Table 3 shows the mechanism.
| Control Level | Empty Weight (kg) | Activity Radius (km) | Flight Height (m) | Flight Speed (Mach) | Camera Function |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Red (Level 1) | W > 5700 | R > 200 | H > 7000 | S > 1.2 | Yes |
| Yellow (Level 2) | 116 < W ≤ 5700 | 50 < R ≤ 200 | 1000 < H ≤ 7000 | 0.7 < S ≤ 1.2 | Yes |
| Blue (Level 3) | 7 < W ≤ 116 | 15 < R ≤ 50 | 150 < H ≤ 1000 | 0.3 < S ≤ 0.7 | – |
| White (Level 4) | 0 < W ≤ 7 | 0 < R ≤ 15 | 0 < H ≤ 150 | 0 < S ≤ 0.3 | – |
Construct a drone airspace management model. Civil aviation divides airspace into A, B, C, D; for drones, according to “General Aviation Flight Management Regulations,” they can use segregated airspace but not distinguished. Dividing segregated airspace for drone management could greatly improve utilization and ensure benefits.
Drones in agricultural remote sensing, seeding, fertilization, land protection, industrial power line inspection, highway, shipping, railway monitoring, large-scale mapping, aerial prospecting, and low-altitude logistics, especially in mountains, gullies, rivers, lakes, are expanding applications. But regulations require pre-application for segregated airspace and flight plans, inhibiting development.
Thus, using 150m height as threshold, build a drone airspace management model. This height matches Level 4 (white) in the new mechanism. In this分区, for ultra-low altitude operations, if meeting Level 4, no flight plan needed; Level 3, report flight path, equipment, operator info 24 hours pre-flight, AOPA审批; Levels 2 and 1, follow CAAC procedures.
Simplify flight application processes, shorten approval times. According to “Non-Operational General Aviation Registration Regulations (CCAR-285),” civil drones must apply to local flight control departments pre-flight. But in practice, though public easily buys drones, many lack knowledge of theory, procedures, submitting units; plus, multiple departments, long processes, cause lengthy cycles, leading to unwillingness to apply, “forced black flights.” So, under safety, provide convenient, fast application channels, timely approval for eligible cases.
Simplify审批流程: use mobile apps, pre-enter operator info, licenses, drone registration, facial recognition; pre-flight, submit operator name, contact, time, height, airspace, emergency measures via app;管理部门 can verify, assess risks and measures, approve via server terminals, electronic processes shortening steps, time, improving efficiency. E.g., micro-drones outside no-fly zones, Level 4, no application; general drones for daily work, only send dynamic info for real-time monitoring; for “urgent, difficult, dangerous” tasks, simplify approval. Since drones must connect to cloud systems with “cloud” tech, operators can use for quick applications, managers approve in “cloud” for fast airspace use.
Standardize drone-related personnel to avoid human factor threats. Production personnel should strictly follow standards, install necessary equipment, conduct finished product checks, ensure uniform market quality, compliance. In production, fit each drone with electronic fences for pre-control. Electronic fences use pulsed electronics and geofencing to define boundaries, integrating with flight control for safety. They use longitude, latitude, height limit, valid time to define space, building a fence model. If drones leave or enter “no-fly zones,” pulses signal, intervene operation, warn operators; if continued, lock drone, prevent flight, trigger “safe mode” for immediate landing or return.
Sales personnel should clarify sales processes, crack down on illegal sales. With e-commerce, online shopping is daily; drone industry uses “online + offline” sales, boosting market, but breeding control gaps. Thus, pre-payment online, add verification—facial, fingerprint, voice recognition—matching buyer’s drone license info. If match, purchase allowed; if not, system blocks, preventing “unlicensed” purchases, avoiding public safety incidents.
“Offline” sales require seller real-name registration, recording names, IDs, qualifications, raising seller thresholds, requiring knowledge of basics, laws, system procedures. Non-compliant sellers suspend service until trained.
This ensures buyers responsibility; if incidents, “traceable,” immediate control; reduces “unlicensed” holders, lowering “black flights”; improves seller skills, standardizes processes.
Owners must strictly implement real-name registration, ensure data accuracy. Besides self-compliance, society should promote registration, elevate to legal scope. For data accuracy, add public security verification, using backend real data to check entries, ensuring truthfulness, urging honest personal info, drone body info, usage purposes. After entry, owners must print generated QR codes with info, attach to visible, durable, inspectable parts.
Use tech to control incorrect info owners. E.g., in “drone real-name registration system,” if data mismatches public security backend or drone numbers, system prompts re-entry; after five consecutive failures, trigger control software, preventing drone startup, flight, normal use.
Operators: improve training quality, clarify “licensed operation.” From CAAC’s “China Civil Aviation Pilot Development Annual Report (2019),” valid unmanned aircraft pilot licenses reached 67,218. But as drones enter public view, industry scales, operator teams will explode; by 2022, annual license demand estimated 100,000. Meanwhile, most public safety incidents stem from operational errors, “unlicensed” human factors. So, further strengthen operator control.
Increase initial training difficulty and quality. Current “Interim Regulations” set skill, experience, knowledge requirements but no mandatory hours. Since drones are special, suggest initial license applicants comprehensively learn theory and practice, increase difficulty, extend hours. Training content: national usage rules—permissible ranges, heights, building distances; basic operation knowledge. This ensures operators know laws,约束 themselves, understand principles, aiding practice.
Reference civil aviation pilots for license management. As drone mobility improves, range expands, operator pressure and skills near pilots, so manage licenses similarly. Post-license, CAAC lacks ongoing certification rules. Reference civil pilots require annual retraining, medical checks, certification flights, CAAC verification. Thus, sort all current licenses, clarify sole issuing body, deregister non-compliant; second, specify training, retraining institutions or fixed units, use laws to约束 numerous training bodies, close unqualified “folk” organizations. Establish operator qualification methods—initial certification, annual review, periodic training—standardize exam content, costs, license management.
Additionally, regulations require license renewal every two years, but for drones, interval long. So, reference civil pilot management, change to annual renewal, further improving skills, eliminating rust from disuse, reducing “human factor” errors; second, for non-renewal, failure, or legal violations, deregister, bar from direct/indirect operation, but can reapply as initial; third, for licenses期间 legal violations, public safety incidents, after review, revoke licenses, bar reapplication for three years.
Strengthen cooperative governance for co-governance effects. Accelerate integrated control platform construction, covering relevant departments: CAAC, air traffic control, public security, state security, airlines, airports, etc. In drone risk incidents, platform personnel collate info, share within platform. Per cooperative governance, departments analyze obtained info, control within jurisdictions, cross-coordinate, publish processes, outcomes in platform, facilitating post-analysis to find risk gaps, improve system, prevent recurrences.
Combining cooperative governance theory, via the integrated platform, enhance info exchange, fully grasp drone status and dynamics, integrate all info, leverage departmental functions in systems, policies, R&D, production, sales, use, emergency, etc., effectively solving public safety issues, promoting industry development.
Sort control links, ensure departmental coordination. Since drone public safety involves many departments, fully utilize control advantages, sort processes, coordinate well, jointly control drones. Market regulatory departments: standardize sales, fully grasp market dynamics via manufacturer registration, combined with drone registration system for dual management, effectively supervising drones, owner info, usage. Clarify owner usage responsibility, add drone insurance, reducing public safety impacts. CAAC: set industry standards, ensure safe air flight; refine standards by characteristics, follow “sense and avoid” principle, explore shared airspace with civil aircraft; delineate usable airspace ranges and altitudes, with constraints in shared zones, preventing incidents. Training departments: strict training, standardize flight activities; address prior issues, emphasize more; with drone increase, licensed operator demand rises, so training should be targeted—not only skilled flight but also laws; collaborate or commission manufacturers, sellers, know buyer info提前, proactively提醒 unlicensed owners to train, prepare提前量. Drone associations: strengthen operator training, ensure flight safety; as performance improves, range expands, operators equal pilots, training should reference pilots—initial, annual retraining, type conversion, certification training.
Through multi-department joint governance and info exchange via integrated platform, drone control can upgrade, truly solving public safety issues.
Establish emergency response mechanisms, add auxiliary control equipment. Emergency plans are action plans for effective response to emergencies; for drone control, equally important. Establish mechanisms including plan systems, management systems, operational mechanisms, legal systems, following principles: combine prevention and emergency, normal and abnormal events, human factors and drone factors.
As first responders, public security should assess potential drone risks, form standardized, procedural handling procedures, rules, and issue emergency plans, regularly conduct drills, incorporate new crisis risks, summarize results, continuously revise, update plans, enhance comprehensiveness and operability. Drills accumulate practical experience, improve response speed, enabling adept handling of drone emergencies.
Increase use of new control equipment and scope. Adopt drone “cloud” tech. Similar to aircraft “black boxes,” it records all operational dynamic data into databases. For drones, “cloud” tech helps operators promptly provide navigation, route, weather info, and monitors and stores operational data (operator info, drone info, position, height, speed, etc.), aiding auxiliary control. In risk events, control terminals see abnormal data, immediately retrieve flight data—track, height, speed, position, heading—providing data for department response, while using radio to intercept, force landing, etc., preventing greater harm.
Expand countermeasure tech, rationally use countermeasure equipment. For “black flights,” use countermeasures to force landing or destroy drones, the quickest method for emergencies. As public safety severity increases, counter-drone tech must strengthen, expand as shown in principles. Counter-drone tech uses acoustic, optical, electromagnetic, infrared detection, data fusion for target identification, then system calculation, evaluation, decision,采取 countermeasures—interference disruption, destruction capture, monitoring control. Interference disruption uses high-power radio signals, acoustic waves to disrupt drone receivers, preventing accurate coordinate acquisition, causing return or landing; destruction capture uses lasers, microwaves, high energy to destroy targets, with long range, effective strikes, low external influence; monitoring control uses radio hijacking, GPS spoofing to send false navigation signals, causing onboard computers to deviate from paths, forcing return or landing.
During major events, to avoid drone effects, control departments can reasonably use countermeasure equipment in involved airspace, ensuring safety. E.g., drone counter guns, command vehicles, defense bases, directional systems, spectrum detection, detection singles. For airport civil aviation safety, install monitoring equipment外围, nearby空地, clearance zones for 24/7 monitoring, and install countermeasures without affecting navigation. If illegal objects appear near airport or routes, trigger safety alerts, countermeasures quickly locate drones, radio干扰, force landing, ensuring safety.
Conclusion
As an emerging industry, civil drone development and prosperity are significant for China’s aviation and economic development, aligning with national strategy and gaining policy support. With AI advances, smart hardware trends smaller, lower cost, power, reducing costs, creating a favorable environment for sustained stable growth and broad prospects.
Based on a risk regulation perspective, this study researches civil drone safety issues. It summarizes literature on drone control, reviews China’s control systems and methods, uses risk regulation theory, cooperative governance theory, and multiple methods for analysis, identifying existing system deficiencies and causes, proposing optimization paths. Main conclusions:
First, three major public safety issues with civil drones: rapid industry development outpaces control systems, incomplete laws, unclear standards; poor management of four related personnel types directly/indirectly causing “black flights,” “unlicensed flights”; unclear emergency plans for potential safety issues.
Second, proposed optimization paths: further improve the institutional system, set production and testing standards, refine categories with classified management, construct airspace management; strengthen control over production, sales, ownership, operation personnel to reduce “human factor” risks; establish an integrated control platform, enhance cooperative governance, formulate emergency plans, conduct regular drills, use new equipment for auxiliary control.
This paper integrates risk regulation into drone safety work, striving to identify control challenges and find a feasible optimization path. As drone safety is complex, involving product quality, laws, operators, multi-department coordination, software/hardware, etc., and due to limited author水平, research may be incomplete or superficial, so shortcomings remain: incomplete safety issue research, insufficient understanding of related tech developments, affecting control status, deficiency, cause analysis, possibly dulling conclusions. Later, from work and life, further explore drones, risk regulation theory, cooperative governance theory for stronger theoretical support. Limited personal research level may make paths imperfect,遗漏, or practical deviations, needing verification and supplementation in future practice.