In recent years, with the rapid advancement of technologies such as networking, artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, and big data, unmanned combat systems have developed swiftly. Drone swarm operations are transitioning from concept to reality, moving from theory to practice. For instance, in March 2019, a large-scale exercise in the Persian Gulf involved dozens of drones flying over long distances to destroy targets, highlighting the imminent security threats posed by drone swarms. This underscores the critical need for effective anti-drone swarm strategies. The complexity of anti-drone measures, involving multiple手段 and equipment, can lead to command confusion and resource waste if not properly coordinated. Therefore, rational integration of作战手段 and selection of optimal作战方案 can enhance cost-effectiveness and reduce command-and-control difficulties, ultimately improving system作战 efficiency. This paper focuses on evaluating the effectiveness of anti-drone swarm operations, aiming to establish a comprehensive evaluation index system for electronic countermeasures against drone swarms and propose a practical assessment approach for优选作战方案.

Currently, various countries are actively developing anti-drone technologies, which can be broadly categorized into detection and tracking,干扰对抗, and destruction打击. Based on these, the effectiveness evaluation model for anti-drone swarm operations is constructed from four criteria: reconnaissance, deception, soft kill, and hard destroy. The index system is illustrated in a hierarchical structure, with detailed explanations provided for each indicator. For example, taking “DJI” drone swarms as targets, the indicators are defined as follows.
Anti-Drone Swarm作战效能评估 Index System
The evaluation system includes 12 primary indicators under four criteria, each with sub-indicators. Below is a summary table of the指标体系 for anti-drone swarm operations.
| Criteria | Primary Indicators | Sub-Indicators | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reconnaissance | Radar Reconnaissance | Maximum Detection Distance | The farthest distance at which the radar can detect the drone swarm. Larger distance is beneficial for defense. Formula: $$ R_{a_{max}} = \left[ \frac{P_t G_t^2 n_{\sigma} \lambda^2}{(4\pi)^3 P_{a_{min}}} \right]^{\frac{1}{4}} $$ where \( P_t \) is transmit power, \( G_t \) is antenna gain, \( n_{\sigma} \) is effective cross-section for n drones, \( P_{a_{min}} \) is minimum detectable signal power. |
| Target Tracking Number | Number of individual drones in the swarm that can be simultaneously tracked. More is better. | ||
| Equipment Quantity | Number of radar units deployed. More units improve reconnaissance effectiveness. | ||
| Radio Reconnaissance | Direction-finding Accuracy | Accuracy of direction-finding equipment. Higher accuracy is beneficial. | |
| Frequency Range | Covered frequency bands. Wider range is better. | ||
| Equipment Quantity | Number of radio reconnaissance units. More units enhance effectiveness. | ||
| Electro-Optical/Infrared Reconnaissance | Maximum Detection Distance | Maximum warning distance for small drones. Larger distance is advantageous. | |
| Equipment Quantity | Number of electro-optical/infrared units. More units improve效果. | ||
| Deception | Camouflage Deception | Camouflage Area | Effective area covered by camouflage devices. Larger area is beneficial. |
| Deception Type Quantity | Number of enemy reconnaissance types that can be防护. More types improve deception. | ||
| Decoy Deployment | Decoy Quantity | Number and types of decoys deployed. More is better. | |
| Frequency Range | Frequency bands covered by decoys. Wider range enhances诱骗效果. | ||
| Soft Kill | Radio Interference | Equipment Quantity | Number of radio干扰 units. More units improve干扰效果. |
| Interference Distance | Maximum distance for jamming drone command communications. Larger distance is beneficial. Formula: $$ K_j \leq \frac{P_j G_j q_{r_j}(\theta) \gamma_j \phi_k R_j \Delta f_r}{P_t G_t q_{r_t} \phi_t R_t \Delta f_j} $$ where \( P_j, G_j \) are jammer power and gain, \( P_t, G_t \) are enemy communication power and gain, \( R_j, R_t \) are干扰 distance and enemy communication distance, \( K_j \) is jamming suppression coefficient. | ||
| Interference Frequency Band | Frequency coverage of interference. Wider range is better. | ||
| Interference Power | Transmit power of the equipment. Higher power improves效果. | ||
| Navigation Interference | Equipment Quantity | Number of navigation干扰 units. More units enhance effectiveness. | |
| Interference Distance | Maximum distance for jamming drone navigation signals. Larger distance is beneficial. | ||
| Interference Type Quantity | Number of navigation systems that can be干扰 (e.g., GPS, BeiDou). More types are advantageous. | ||
| Interference Power | Transmit power. Higher power improves效果. | ||
| Link Seizure Control | Equipment Quantity | Number of link seizure units. More units are beneficial. | |
| Seizure Number | Number of drones that can be simultaneously seized. More is better. | ||
| Seizure Mode | Mode of seizure: forced landing or control. Control is more favorable for defense. | ||
| Net-based Weapon Capture | Equipment Quantity | Number of net-based weapon units. More units improve effectiveness. | |
| Effective Distance | Maximum distance for launching nets or foam. Larger distance is beneficial. | ||
| Effective Area | Area covered by launched nets or foam. Larger area is advantageous. | ||
| Hard Destroy | Laser Strike | Effective Strike Distance | Maximum distance for effective damage to drones. Larger distance is beneficial. |
| Single Emission Duration | Maximum duration of laser emission per shot. Longer duration increases success rate. | ||
| Fire Transfer Time | Minimum time between strikes. Shorter time allows more drones to be engaged per unit time. | ||
| Equipment Quantity | Number of laser weapon units. More units improve打击效果. | ||
| High-Power Microwave Attack | Beam Width | Width of microwave beam, determining defense area. Wider beam is beneficial under same power. | |
| Transmit Power | Power of electromagnetic pulse. Higher power is advantageous. | ||
| Frequency Range | Targeted frequency bands for attack. Wider range is better. | ||
| Equipment Quantity | Number of microwave attack units. More units enhance effectiveness. | ||
| Firepower Strike | Cost-Effectiveness Ratio | Ratio of defense cost to destroyed drone cost. Higher ratio is favorable for defense. | |
| Fire Transfer Time | Minimum time between火力打击 shots. Shorter time increases engagement rate. | ||
| Equipment Quantity | Number of firepower strike units. More units are beneficial. |
This comprehensive index system forms the basis for evaluating anti-drone swarm作战效能. Each indicator is quantified based on equipment parameters or battlefield data, enabling a systematic assessment of various anti-drone measures.
Determination of Indicator Weights Using Fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy Process (FAHP)
To assign weights to the indicators, the Fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy Process (FAHP) is employed due to its ability to handle imprecision and hierarchical structures. Common methods like AHP,德尔菲法, and direct scoring have limitations in precision for反无人机蜂群作战效能评估. FAHP involves constructing triangular fuzzy number complementary judgment matrices, calculating expectation matrices, and performing consistency checks. The process for determining weights from criteria layer to indicator layer is outlined below.
First, for the criteria layer B relative to the target layer A, a triangular fuzzy number complementary judgment matrix is established:
$$ \tilde{A} = \begin{bmatrix}
(0.50,0.50,0.50) & (0.15,0.20,0.25) & (0.25,0.30,0.35) & (0.35,0.40,0.45) \\
(0.75,0.80,0.85) & (0.50,0.50,0.50) & (0.65,0.70,0.75) & (0.55,0.60,0.65) \\
(0.65,0.70,0.75) & (0.25,0.30,0.35) & (0.50,0.50,0.50) & (0.35,0.40,0.45) \\
(0.55,0.60,0.65) & (0.35,0.40,0.45) & (0.55,0.60,0.65) & (0.50,0.50,0.50)
\end{bmatrix} $$
The expectation matrix E is computed by taking the average values of the triangular fuzzy numbers:
$$ E = \begin{bmatrix}
0.5000 & 0.2000 & 0.3000 & 0.4000 \\
0.8000 & 0.5000 & 0.7000 & 0.6000 \\
0.7000 & 0.3000 & 0.5000 & 0.4000 \\
0.6000 & 0.4000 & 0.6000 & 0.5000
\end{bmatrix} $$
Then, the positive reciprocal matrix H is derived from E:
$$ H = \begin{bmatrix}
1 & 0.2500 & 0.4286 & 0.6667 \\
4 & 1 & 2.3333 & 1.5 \\
2.3333 & 0.4286 & 1 & 0.6667 \\
1.5 & 0.6667 & 1.5 & 1
\end{bmatrix} $$
The maximum real eigenvalue \( \lambda_{max} \) of H is calculated as 4.0725. Consistency is checked using the consistency index \( IC \), random index \( IR \), and consistency ratio \( RC \):
$$ IC = \frac{\lambda_{max} – k}{k – 1} = \frac{4.0725 – 4}{4 – 1} = 0.0091 $$
With \( IR = 0.9 \), \( RC = \frac{IC}{IR} = 0.0269 < 0.1 \), indicating acceptable consistency.
Next, fuzzy evaluation values and expectations are computed for each criterion. For criterion 1:
$$ \tilde{u}_1 = (0.2849, 0.3250, 0.3716) $$
$$ E(\tilde{u}_1) = 0.3266 $$
Similarly, for others: \( E(\tilde{u}_2) = 0.1762 \), \( E(\tilde{u}_3) = 0.2640 \), \( E(\tilde{u}_4) = 0.2389 \).
After normalization, the weight vector for criteria layer B is:
$$ \alpha_A = (0.3248, 0.1752, 0.2858, 0.1370) $$
Following the same FAHP process, weight vectors for indicator layers are determined. For example, for雷达侦察 under reconnaissance:
$$ \alpha_{B1} = (0.4893, 0.2888, 0.2220) $$
Similarly, other weights are computed. The final weights for all sub-indicators are aggregated. A summary table of weights is provided below.
| Indicator Layer | Sub-Indicator | Weight |
|---|---|---|
| Radar Reconnaissance | Maximum Detection Distance | 0.1589 |
| Target Tracking Number | 0.0938 | |
| Equipment Quantity | 0.0721 | |
| Radio Reconnaissance | Direction-finding Accuracy | 0.0963 |
| Frequency Range | 0.0789 | |
| Equipment Quantity | 0.0821 | |
| Electro-Optical/Infrared Reconnaissance | Maximum Detection Distance | 0.1035 |
| Equipment Quantity | 0.0608 | |
| Camouflage Deception | Camouflage Area | 0.0394 |
| Deception Type Quantity | 0.0426 | |
| Decoy Deployment | Decoy Quantity | 0.0563 |
| Frequency Range | 0.0381 | |
| Radio Interference | Equipment Quantity | 0.0653 |
| Interference Distance | 0.0494 | |
| Interference Frequency Band | 0.0442 | |
| Interference Power | 0.0454 | |
| Navigation Interference | Equipment Quantity | 0.0271 |
| Interference Distance | 0.0208 | |
| Interference Type Quantity | 0.0379 | |
| Interference Power | 0.0342 | |
| Link Seizure Control | Equipment Quantity | 0.0530 |
| Seizure Number | 0.0433 | |
| Seizure Mode | 0.0473 | |
| Net-based Weapon Capture | Equipment Quantity | 0.0316 |
| Effective Distance | 0.0195 | |
| Effective Area | 0.0277 | |
| Laser Strike | Effective Strike Distance | 0.0113 |
| Single Emission Duration | 0.0236 | |
| Fire Transfer Time | 0.0181 | |
| Equipment Quantity | 0.0336 | |
| High-Power Microwave Attack | Beam Width | 0.0142 |
| Transmit Power | 0.0296 | |
| Frequency Range | 0.0169 | |
| Equipment Quantity | 0.0243 | |
| Firepower Strike | Cost-Effectiveness Ratio | 0.0196 |
| Fire Transfer Time | 0.0109 | |
| Equipment Quantity | 0.0162 |
These weights reflect the relative importance of each indicator in anti-drone swarm作战效能评估, derived through FAHP to ensure精度 and consistency.
Case Study for Anti-Drone Swarm作战方案 Evaluation
To validate the effectiveness evaluation model, a case study is conducted using实兵模拟演练 data.假设 a smart command system exists to handle the complexity of numerous anti-drone方案 combinations. Three representative作战方案 are selected, targeting a swarm of 10 “DJI” drones. The indicator values for each scheme are collected and normalized for comparison.
First, the raw indicator values for the three schemes are tabulated. These include parameters such as maximum detection distances, equipment quantities, interference distances, etc., based on actual equipment性能.
| Indicator | Sub-Indicator | Scheme 1 | Scheme 2 | Scheme 3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Radar Reconnaissance | Maximum Detection Distance (km) | 20.3 | 0 | 19.5 |
| Target Tracking Number | 6 | 0 | 5 | |
| Equipment Quantity | 2 | 0 | 1 | |
| Radio Reconnaissance | Direction-finding Accuracy (°) | 0 | 6.65 | 5 |
| Frequency Range (MHz) | 0 | 80 | 150 | |
| Equipment Quantity | 0 | 2 | 1 | |
| Electro-Optical/Infrared Reconnaissance | Maximum Detection Distance (km) | 6 | 5.5 | 0 |
| Equipment Quantity | 2 | 1 | 0 | |
| Camouflage Deception | Camouflage Area (m²) | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| Deception Type Quantity | 2 | 1 | 1 | |
| Decoy Deployment | Decoy Quantity | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Frequency Range (MHz) | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| Radio Interference | Equipment Quantity | 0 | 2 | 1 |
| Interference Distance (km) | 0 | 8 | 10 | |
| Interference Frequency Band (MHz) | 0 | 80 | 150 | |
| Interference Power (kW) | 0 | 0.15 | 0.3 | |
| Navigation Interference | Equipment Quantity | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Interference Distance (km) | 50 | 0 | 30 | |
| Interference Type Quantity | 1 | 0 | 1 | |
| Interference Power (kW) | 10 | 0 | 8 | |
| Link Seizure Control | Equipment Quantity | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Seizure Number | 0 | 1 | 0 | |
| Seizure Mode | 0 | 2 | 0 | |
| Net-based Weapon Capture | Equipment Quantity | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Effective Distance (m) | 2 | 0 | 0 | |
| Effective Area (m²) | 75 | 0 | 0 | |
| Laser Strike | Effective Strike Distance (m) | 5 | 0 | 0 |
| Single Emission Duration (s) | 200 | 0 | 0 | |
| Fire Transfer Time (s) | 6 | 0 | 0 | |
| Equipment Quantity | 1 | 0 | 0 | |
| High-Power Microwave Attack | Beam Width (°) | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| Transmit Power (kW) | 0 | 0 | 100 | |
| Frequency Range (MHz) | 0 | 0 | 500 | |
| Equipment Quantity | 0 | 0 | 2 | |
| Firepower Strike | Cost-Effectiveness Ratio | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Fire Transfer Time (s) | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| Equipment Quantity | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Next, normalization is applied to standardize the indicator values. For benefit-type indicators, the formula is: $$ z_{ij} = \frac{y_{ij}}{\left( \sum_{i=1}^{m} y_{ij}^2 \right)^{1/2}} $$ For cost-type indicators, the formula is: $$ z_{ij} = \frac{1/y_{ij}}{\left[ \sum_{i=1}^{m} (1/y_{ij})^2 \right]^{1/2}} $$ Since all indicators here are benefit-type (higher values are better), the first formula is used. The normalized values are computed and summarized in the following table.
| Indicator | Sub-Indicator | Scheme 1 (Normalized) | Scheme 2 (Normalized) | Scheme 3 (Normalized) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Radar Reconnaissance | Maximum Detection Distance | 0.7212 | 0.0000 | 0.6928 |
| Target Tracking Number | 0.7682 | 0.0000 | 0.6402 | |
| Equipment Quantity | 0.8944 | 0.0000 | 0.4472 | |
| Radio Reconnaissance | Direction-finding Accuracy | 0.0000 | 0.7993 | 0.6010 |
| Frequency Range | 0.0000 | 0.4706 | 0.8824 | |
| Equipment Quantity | 0.0000 | 0.8944 | 0.4472 | |
| Electro-Optical/Infrared Reconnaissance | Maximum Detection Distance | 0.7372 | 0.6757 | 0.0000 |
| Equipment Quantity | 0.8944 | 0.4472 | 0.0000 | |
| Camouflage Deception | Camouflage Area | 0.5774 | 0.5774 | 0.5774 |
| Deception Type Quantity | 0.8165 | 0.4082 | 0.4082 | |
| Decoy Deployment | Decoy Quantity | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 |
| Frequency Range | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | |
| Radio Interference | Equipment Quantity | 0.0000 | 0.8944 | 0.4472 |
| Interference Distance | 0.0000 | 0.6247 | 0.7809 | |
| Interference Frequency Band | 0.0000 | 0.4706 | 0.8824 | |
| Interference Power | 0.0000 | 0.4472 | 0.8944 | |
| Navigation Interference | Equipment Quantity | 0.7071 | 0.0000 | 0.7071 |
| Interference Distance | 0.8575 | 0.0000 | 0.5145 | |
| Interference Type Quantity | 0.7071 | 0.0000 | 0.7071 | |
| Interference Power | 0.7809 | 0.0000 | 0.6247 | |
| Link Seizure Control | Equipment Quantity | 0.0000 | 1.0000 | 0.0000 |
| Seizure Number | 0.0000 | 1.0000 | 0.0000 | |
| Seizure Mode | 0.0000 | 1.0000 | 0.0000 | |
| Net-based Weapon Capture | Equipment Quantity | 1.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 |
| Effective Distance | 1.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | |
| Effective Area | 1.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | |
| Laser Strike | Effective Strike Distance | 1.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 |
| Single Emission Duration | 1.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | |
| Fire Transfer Time | 1.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | |
| Equipment Quantity | 1.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | |
| High-Power Microwave Attack | Beam Width | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 1.0000 |
| Transmit Power | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 1.0000 | |
| Frequency Range | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 1.0000 | |
| Equipment Quantity | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 1.0000 | |
| Firepower Strike | Cost-Effectiveness Ratio | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 |
| Fire Transfer Time | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | |
| Equipment Quantity | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 |
Using the weights from the FAHP analysis, the overall evaluation value for each anti-drone scheme is computed by summing the weighted normalized values. The results are as follows:
| Scheme | Evaluation Value |
|---|---|
| Scheme 1 | 0.4058 |
| Scheme 2 | 0.2682 |
| Scheme 3 | 0.3818 |
Based on the evaluation values, Scheme 1 demonstrates the highest effectiveness among the three, followed by Scheme 3 and then Scheme 2. This outcome aligns with实兵验证 results, where Scheme 1’s combination of radar reconnaissance, electro-optical/infrared侦察, navigation interference, net-based weapons, and laser strike capabilities provides a balanced anti-drone defense. However, it is important to note that Scheme 1 is optimal only within this subset; a smart command system would evaluate all possible combinations to identify the absolute best anti-drone作战方案 for real-time battlefield conditions.
Conclusion and Future Directions for Anti-Drone Swarm Operations
This paper presents a comprehensive efficiency evaluation model for anti-drone swarm operations, focusing on electronic countermeasures. By constructing an index system based on reconnaissance, deception, soft kill, and hard destroy criteria, and applying the Fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy Process to determine indicator weights, a method for assessing and优选作战方案 is developed. The case study validates the model’s practicality, showing that it can effectively compare different anti-drone schemes and support command decision-making. The integration of such models into intelligent command systems, leveraging cloud computing and big data, can enhance real-time optimization of anti-drone measures, improving作战 efficiency and resource allocation.
Looking ahead, the evolution of drone technology suggests that drone swarms will play increasingly significant roles in future warfare, not only in骚扰 and reconnaissance but also in integrated network-centric operations. Drones may form networks with manned aircraft, satellites, ground vehicles, and naval vessels, potentially realizing scenarios akin to science fiction. Therefore, it is imperative to advance anti-drone swarm technologies and build integrated joint defense systems. Emphasis should be placed on enhancing the intelligence level of武器装备, utilizing various models and algorithms to provide optimal作战方案 for command authorities. This will elevate overall作战 efficiency in countering the growing threat of drone swarms.
Future research could refine the evaluation指标体系 to account for dynamic factors such as target types, battlefield environments, and weather conditions. Additionally, incorporating machine learning algorithms for adaptive weight adjustment could further improve the accuracy of anti-drone效能评估. As anti-drone measures evolve, continuous updates to the model will ensure its relevance and effectiveness in safeguarding against emerging drone swarm threats.
